ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must
necessarily be declared void, at least so far as its operation in the
several states is concerned.
This conclusion disposes of the cases now under consideration.
In the cases of the United States v. Hichael RByan, and of Richard
A. Robinson and Vife against The Memphis and Charleston
Railroad Co., the judgments must be affirmed. In the other cases,
the answer to be given will be that the first and second sections of
the Act of Congress of March 1st 1875, entitled, " An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights" are unconstitutional
and void, and that judgment should be rendered upon the several
indictments in those cases accordingly. And it is so ordered.
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ARBITRATION.
Partnership Settlement by/ Accountant-Opening of Settlement.Where partners sought and obtained the aid of an accountant in adjusting their accounts, for the purpose of a settlement, and he prepared a
ADMIRALTY.

paper showing what he considered a fair settlement between them, which
they adopted: Held, that this was no arbitration, and the paper prepared
by the accountant was no award, it merely constituting a settlement,
liable to be opened for mistake: Stage v. Gorich, 107 Ill.
Where it is clearly shown that one partner has made advances for the
use of the firm, of considerable sums, which were not taken into consideration at a settlement had between the partners, on bill filed by one of
the partners for an account, it was held, the cause should have been
referred to the master to state anew the accounts, so far as concerned
the omitted items: Id.
I From Hon. Norman L. Freeman, Reporter, to appear in 107 Ill. Rep.
2 From J. Schaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 60 21d. Reports.
3 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 134 Miass. Rep.

4 From Edwin T. Palmer, Reporter, to appear in 55 Vt. Rep.
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ATTACHMENT.

Replevin for Goods attached-Assumpsit against Officer for J1foney
held under Attachment.-The mortgagee of goods attached, while in the
possession of the mbrtgagor, by an invalid attachment, may maintain
replevin against the attaching officer: Allen v. Wright, 134 Mass.
Money held under an invalid attachment may be recovered of the
attaching officer in an action for money had and received : Id.
Seamens' Wages.-The wages of a seaman on a coasting voyage on
the Atlantic coast are subject to attachment by the trustee process:
White v. Dunn, 134 Mass.
BILLS AND NOTES.

When not Negotiable-Stipulation for Interest-Parol Evidence to
vary-Estoppel.-In an action upon a non-negotiable promissory note,
signed by the defendant and payable to a third person or bearer, the
plaintiff offered to show that when the defendant gave him the note, he
told the defendant it should be in his name or to his order, and that the
defendant replied, "1It is all right, it makes no difference, it is payable
to bearer and you can collect." field, that the evidence was inadmissible to vary the legal effect of the instrument; and that it could
not operate as an estoppel to prevent the defendant from contending
that the plaintiff could not maintain an action on the instrument in his
own' name : Whitwell v. Winslow, 134 Mass.
A promissory note for a certain amount, payable to a person named or
bearer" with interest the same as savings banks pay," is not negotiable:
Id.
Transfer after Afaturity-Defences-Set-off.-The maker of a note,
transferred after it is due, sued in the name of the transferree, cannot
plead in offset a matter which existed between him and the payee at the
time of the transfer, although he can paymext or any defence which
grew out of the note transaction : Armstrong v. Noble, 55 Vt.
BOND.

Good as a Common-Law Obligation, though not in compliance with
the Statute.-An obligation entered into voluntarily, and for a sufficient
consideration, unless it contravenes the policy of the law, or is repugnant to some provision of the statute, is valid at common law, notwithstanding the attempt may have been to execute it pursuant to a statute
with the terms of which it does not strictly comply : Barnes v. Brookman, 107 Ill.
COMMON CARRIER.

Snrrender of Goods under Attachment- Trover by Consignor-A
common carrier is not liable in trover to the consignor, for surrendering
the possession of goods, entrusted to him for carriage, to an officer, who
attaches them upon legal process against the consignee : rench v. Star
lUnion Trans. Co., 134 Mass.
A common carrier, who surrenders the possession of goods entrusted
to him for carriage, to an officer, who attaches them upon legal process
against the consignee, is not liable to an action by the consignor, after
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notice by him to hold the goods, for not notifying the officer or taking
steps to stop the goods in transitu: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
State Constitution-Effect of.-A state constitution is a limitation
upon the powers of the legislature, and the legislature possesses every
power not delegated to some other department, or expressly denied to it
by the constitution : Winch v. Tobin, 107 Ill.
Right of Trial by Jury-.Authority to Court of Equity to hear Bills
to quiet Title -The act providing that a court of chancery may hear and
determine bills to quiet title, and to remove clouds from the title of real
estate where the lands are unimproved and unoccupied, is not in violation of the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, as courts of chancery may submit issues of fact to trial by jury. If such right should
be refused by the court, the denial thereof would come from the court,
and not from the law: Gage v. Ewing, 107 Ill.
Where jurisdiction is bestowed by statute upon a court of chancery
in a case where there existed before the adoption of the constitution a
remedy at law, under which was given the right of trial by jury, it is
presumed such a trial would be allowed, if asked, on a trial in chancery,
and obedience paid to the constitutional provision giving such right:
id.
CONTRACT.

Assuming the Debts of Another- Consideration.-Wherea corporation
is formed, and purchases the business and assets of a firm, the members
of which compose the corporation in part, which business is conducted
as before the dissolution of the partnership, and the corporation, as a
part of the consideration of the property and assets of the firm, assumes
its debts and liabilities, the promise to pay such debts is founded on a
sufficient consideration, and a creditor of the firm may maintain an
action for his debt against such corporation, especially when it still continues him in the same employment out of which the debt has arisen:
The Shober and Carqueville Lithographing Go. v. Kerting, 107 Ill.
Consideration-Compromiseof Doubtful Right.-The plaintiff was
heir-at-law of the defendant's testator, but. received nothing under the
will. The defendant was executor, and his wife and daughter legatees.
The plaintiff claimed that he had determined to contest the will on the
ground that it had been obtained by undue influence, that he had given
notice of his intention to the Probate Court, that he had employed counsel,
and had been advised by him to make opposition; that this was known
to the defendant; that the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff
$5000 if he would desist in such opposition ; that the plaintiff in con-,
sideration of such promise, did forbear; and that the will was proved
without delay. Held, in an action to recover the $5000, 1. The plaintiff was neither bound to allege nor prove that undue influence had been
used to procure the making of the will, 2. But the consideration was
sufficient if he was able to show that he honestly thought he had good
and reasonableground for making the claim that the will, so far as it
related to him, was the production of undue influence, and for that
reason he honestly and in good faith intended to oppose its establishment.
VOL. XXXI.-102
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3. A doubtful right compromised, to be a good consideratioa for a promise, must, upon reasonable grounds, be bonestly entertained.
There
must be a yielding of something by each party: Bellows v. Sowles, 55 Vt.
.Nudum pactum-Promse by Town to pay invalid Claim.-In an
action of assumpsit based on a vote of the town, where the plaintiff
offered to prove that he was injured while travelling on the highway
through its insufficiency; that he gave notibe of his injuries, in proper
form, within thirty days, instead of twenty; that he was misled respecting the time within which such notice should be given by information
given him, on which he relied, by one of the selectmen of the town; that
at a legally warned meeting of the voters of the town the plaintiff
presented his claim for damages, insisting that the defendant could not
take advantage of the defect in the notice, and that thereupon the town
voted to pay him $200; which offer of evidence was rejected by the
court below, and a verdict ordered for the defendant: field, that defendant
was not responsible for the misinformation given by one of its selectmen;
that the vote was not a compromise, as there was no mutual yielding of
opposing claims ; and no consideration for the vote : Gregg v. Town of
Weathersfield, 55 Vt.
Breach-Damages-Recoupment-.et-off.-Thecontract was made by
letters. The defendant supposed he had ordered a cider-press with
counter-shaft attachment; but when it came he found it was a press
with power attachment with chain-belt. He knew what he had received
and that the price was $28 more than that of the other. It being late
in the season, and his customers pressing him to do their work, the
defendant set up and used the press. The'plaintiff, supposing the order
to call for the machine which he had sent, gave wrong directions as to
the timbers needed in setting it up, and injury resulted in consequence
to the defendant. The defendant wrote asking the plaintiff if he could
ship the press "at once": and the plaintiff replied that he could, " on
short notice." In a few days thereafter, September 4, 1880, the defendant ordered it to be shipped "1immediately." September 13th, he wrote
again, saying that he had heard nothing from his order; and September
15th the plaintiff replied that the press would be shipped " that day or
the next."
It was not shipped so as to be received until September
80th, 1880. In an action of assumpsit to recover the price: .Held,1.
That by setting up and using the press the defendant accepted it. 2.
That all the facts show that both parties contemplated an immediate
fulfilment of the order to ship the press. 8. That the plaintiff is liable
for all damages resulting directly and naturally from his delay in per,
forming the contract, and for his erroneous directions as to using the
timbers in setting up the press, and, hence is liable for loss incurred in
changing the timbers, loss of time of workmen, and loss on the stock;
but not for loss of custom, it being too indirect And remote: Dennis v.
Stoughton, 55 Vt.
CRI-IINAL LAW.
Proving an Alibi-Findng Stolen Property in possession of the Accused.-It is well settled that the onus of proving an alibi in a criminal
case devolves upon the accused, and it must be clearly and satisfactorily
established before it can avail, where the evidence otherwise makes out
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a clear case against him. This defence cannot be made out in a case
where the evidence to show the same is, in many important particulars,
conflicting or unreliable: Garrity v. The People, 107 Ill.
Where a burglary has been committed, and money and other property taken, it is not indispensable to the conviction of one accused of
the crime to trace the fruits of the crime to his possession. Convictions
or this kind are frequently sustained without such evidence, especially
when the criminating evidence is strong: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Gilt-Possessioet.-The law only requires the donee to taKe such possession as the nature of the property admits of in order to protect it
against attachment by the creditors of the donor ; thus, a father having
purchased a piano for his daughter, moved it into his house, and, some
two months afterwards, on her attaining her majority, made her a birthday party, and in a formal and public manner, in the presence of all the
guests, gave it to her. After this the daughter used the piano as her
own, and all the family treated it as hers, except it was stored in the
father's house, and by his consent was attached, without her knowledge.
After her marriage she lived at her father's house some, and away some,
but the piano was left where it had been, as she had no place to put it:
Held, that the title to the property passed, and it was not attachable by
the creditors of the donor : Ross v. Draper,55 Vt.
DEED.

Delivery-Revocation.-Ifa person executes a deed of land, and places
it in the hands of A. with directions to keep it during the grantor's
life and on his death to deliver it to the grantee, A. holds it as agent
of the grantor, and not as agent of the grantee, and the grantor may
revoke it at any time: Hale v. ."oslin, 134 Mass.
See Constitutional Law; Taxes.
Adverse Holding by Defendant and Laches by1 Plaintff -Where there
is an assertion of title by the complainants, and a positive and distinct
denial of such title by the defendants, the tenants in possession, together
with an exclusive reception of the profits for a long period, and other
acts indicating an adverse holding by the tenants in possession, and
knowledge of such adverse holding, and laches on the part of the complainants, relief cannot be afforded by a court of equity A court of
law is the proper forum for the determination of the controversy: Cowman, v. Colguhoun, 60 Md.
EQUITY.

ERRORS AND APPEALS.

See Removal of Causes.

EVIDENCE.

Extracts from Books on MAechanics.-In an action on the case to
recover for an injury caused by the use of defective machinery, there is
no error in refusing to allow the party to read to the jury certain extracts
from a standard work on mechanics: North Chicago Rolling Mills v.
Monka, 107 Ill.
FORMER RECOVERiY.

Judgment for Instalments.-Where in an action on a bond with a
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penalty, conditioned for the payment of a specified sum in five annual
instalments, with interest, a judgment is confessed for the amount of
the first four instalments then due, with interest to a certain day, such
judgment constitutes no bar to another action on the bond for the subsequent breach, which consisted in the failure to pay the last instalment
with interest: Ahl v. Ahl,60 Md.
FRAUD.
.ANegligence of Party Defrauded.-While the law requires of all persons the exercise of reasonable prudence in the business of life, and does
not permit one to rest indifferent in reliance upon the interested representations of an adverse party, still there is a certain limit to this rule,
and as between the original parties, when it appears that one has been
guilty of an intentional and deliberate fraud, by which to his knowledge
the other has been misled and influenced in his action, he cannot escape
the legal consequences of his fraudulent conduct by saying that the fraud
might have been discovered had the party whom he deceived exercised
reasonable care and diligence : Linington v. Strong, 107 Ill.
GIFT.
What Constitutes-Ijoan-Limitation,Statute of.-Where bonds are
delivered by one person to another under an express promise, made in
writing, by the latter to return the same " whenever called for," the
promise is a written contract, the terms and conditions of which cannot
lawfully be varied or modified by parol proof, and such undertaking is
entirely incompatible with the idea of an absolute gift: Sellecc v.
Selleck, 107 Ill.
Where a party delivers bonds to another under a written acknowledgment, from which it is evident the party making the delivery intends to
retain his right to call for them if circumstances should make that course
desirable, the transaction cannot be regarded as an absolute gift, even
though he never expected to call for them. In such case it matters not
what may have been his motives for such action : Id.
If bonds are delivered by one person to another under a written contract to return the same "whenever called for," no duty to return the
bonds or their proceeds will arise until an actual demand for the same
is made, and no right of action will accrue to the lender until after such
demand is made, and the Statute of Limitations will not commence to
run until the cause of action accrues : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

.Dvorce-Deathof Husband before -inal Decree-Alimon 3-Abatement.-Whcre pending a suit by the wife for a divorce a mensa et thoro,
the husband dies before a final decree, the court cannot, after the death
of the husband, require his executor to become a party to the suit, to
answer the demand of the wife for an additional allowance for counsel
fees for services rendered in the cause during the lifetime of the husband,
nor pass an order requiring such executor to pay the same : ZXtcCurle?
Md.
v. McCurley, 60
A wife has the right, independently of the actual merits of the case,
to require her husband, when she is living apart from him, and without
means of her own, to defray the expenses of prosecuting her suit for a
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divorce, the court exercising its sound discretion as to when and to what
extent such allowance shall be granted: Id.
A divorce suit. being a personal action, the death of either party
before decree abates the divorce proceedings; and this effect extends to
whatever is identified with those proceedings: Id.
See Taxes.
INJUNCTION.
INTEREST. See Legacy.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Duty to repair-Liabilityto Tenant for absence (ofRailing to Steps.
-A landlord who lets tenements in a building to different tenants, with
a right of way in common over a flight of stone steps, without a railing,
leading from the street to the yard of the building, is not liable to a
tenant injured by falling upon ice accumulated upon the steps, if it is
not the landlord's duty to keep the steps clear of ice, although the steps
are constructed of such material and in such a way as to occasion the
accumulation of ice thereon, there being no change in the construction
of the steps since the tenancy began: Woods v. Naumkceag Steam Cottan Co., 134 Mass.
LEGACY.

Interest on- Computation.-The will contained this clause: 1I give
, $1000, to be paid on her marand bequeath to my daughter,
riage or when she arrives at age, with interest after, at her option." The
will was executed in 1848 ; the legatee attained her majority in 1849,
and was married in 1853 ; the testator died in 1854. Hfeld, that the legacy drew interest as soon as the daughter arrived at age : Trustees of
Bradford Academy v. Grover, 55 Vt.
The legacy bears simple interest; and the payments should be applied
when made, first to extinguish the interest, and then the principal sum:
!d.
LIBEL.

What constituteg-Question of lalice for the Court.-In every free
country a citizen has the right, within lawful and proper limits, to discuss and cebsure, boldly and fearlessly, the official conduct of a public
man ; but there is a broad distinction between fair and legitimate discussion of the conduct of a public man, and the imputation of corrupt
motives by which that conduct may be supposed to be governed. And
if one goes out of his way to asperse the personal character of a public
man, and to ascribe to him base and corrupt motives, he must do so at
his peril, and must either prove the truth of what he says, or answer in
damages to the party injured: Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md.
The fact that one is the proprietor of a newspaper, entitles him to no
privilege in this respect not possessed by the community in general.
The law recognises no duty imposed on him, arising from his relations
to the public, to defame and libel the character of any one; and if he
does, it is no answer to say he did it in good faith and without malice,
honestly believing it to be true: .d.
Malice, but not malice in the ordinary sense of hatred, or ill will
against the person of whom the defamatory words are spoken, is an essential element in an action for libel; but if the publication be in itself
libellous, the law in such cases implies malice : Id.
In an action of libel against the editors of a newspaper, based on the
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publication by them of an article criticising the conduct of the plaintiff
as a public officer, it was .ield, 1. That if the article were per se libellous, and its publication established, the only question before the jury
on the general issue plea of not guilty, was the amount of damage which
under all the circumstances the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 2.
That in estimating the damages the jury were to consider whether the
article was published maliciously and wantonly, for the purpose of injuring the character and reputation of the plaintiff; or as editors of a
newspaper honestly commenting upon the official acts and conduct of
the plaintiff., and in the belief of its truth. 3. That the statute of
32 Geo. III., ch. 60, " Fox's Libel Act," was not in force in Maryland,
and here the court had always decided whether the publication was in
law a libel, leaving the jury to find the fact of publication, and such
other facts as might be pertinent to the issue : Id.
LIlIxTATION, STATUTE OF.

See Gift; Trustee.

Addition of new Count to Declaration-Amendment.-A new cause
of action, distinct from that already mentioned in the declhration, cannot escape the effect of the Statute of Limitations, after the time for
suing upon it has elapsed, by being introduced by way of amendment or
additional counts into the declaration, in an action for a different cause
of action, brought before the lapse of the statutory time : .Noith Chicago Rolling Jlill Go.v. Xonka, 107 Ill.
But when the amendment in an additional count is introduced merely
to restate, in a different form, the same cause of action mentioned in
the declaration as originally drawn, and not to present a new and different cause of action, the rnle has no application, and the plea of the
Statute of Limitations to such new count is not proper: Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Fellow-Servant-Laborerand Saperinteadent-Neligence.-A person employed by a city to superintend the digging of a trench, and a
person employed as a laborer to dig the trench, by the same master, are
prima facie fellow servants : and to maintain, an action against the city
for personal injuries occasioned to the laborer by the negligence of the
superintendent, the declaration must allege facts, the legal effect of which
is that they are not such fellow-servants : Flynn v. C'ty of Salem,
134 Mass.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Negligence of Officer-Liability for.-Cities are not liable for
the negligent acts of the officers or men employed in their fire departments while in the discharge of their duty, thus creating an exception
in this class of cases to the general rule of respondeat superor: Wilcox
v. The City of Chitcago, 107 Ill.
This exemption from liability is placed upon the ground that the service is performed by the corporation in obedience to an act of the legislature, and is one in which the corporation has no particular interest,
and from which it claims no special benefit in its corporate capa.city, and
because the members of the fire department, although appointed and
paid by the city, are not the agents and servants of the city for whose
conduct it is liable, but act rather as officers of the city charged with a
public service, and because sound public policy forbids any liability in
such a case: 1d.
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Areglgence-Defective Sdewal.-A city had notice of a hole in a
sidewalk near a railroad crossing, and neglected to repair the same within
a reasonable time. A person in passing over such walk, exercising due
care, stepped into the hole, whereby he was unavoidably thrown
upon the railway track before an approaching train of cars, and in attempting to get up his clothes caught upon a spike or nail in the sidewalk, and he was struck by the train before he was able to extricate
himself, and killed : Held, the city was liable in damages, under the
statute, to the personal representatives of the deceased, for causing his
death : City of Chicago v. Schmidt, 107 Il.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Master and Servant; MA]unicipal Corporation.

NOTICE.
Record-Purchaser.-Apurchaser is not chargeable with constructive
notice of all instruments and incumbrances of record, but only of such
as lie in the apparent chain of title, or may have been made by one in
some way connected with the property involved in interest, and that
brought home to the notice of the purchaser: Grundies v. Reid, 107
Ill.
See Arbitration.
PARTNERSHIP.
Presumption as to its Existence.-Where parties agree to share in the
profits of a business, the law will infer a partnership between them in
the business to which the agreement relates. This presumption will
control until rebutted by proof to the contrary: Lockwood v. Doane,
107 Ill.
Use of Time in improving Firm Machines-Right to Letters Patent
for Improvement.-If a member of a copartnership, the articles of
which provide that each partner is to give his time to the business of
the firm, and is not to engage in any other speculation or business in his
own name and on his own account to the detriment of the firm, uses his
time, and labor and materials belonging to the firm, in making improvements in machines manufactured and sold by the firm, with the knowledge and without the objection of the other partners, they can claim no
interest in letters patent procured by him, at his expense and in his
name, for such improvements: Belcher v. Whittemore, 134 Mass.
PLEADING. See Limitations, Statute of.
Joinder of Counts.-A count in tort f6r deceit in the sale of stock
may be joined with a count in contract to recover back the price paid:
Teague v. Irwin, 134 Mass.
RAILROAD.
Fraudulent Issue by Clerk of refunding Certificates-Liability of
Company to Innocent Holder.-A clerk in a railroad was entrusted with
refunding certificates in blank to be filled up and delivered to holders
of coupons. He fraudulently filled up some of the certificates and disposed of them: Held, 1. That it was within his employment, and scope
of his duties, to act officially as the agent of the railroad company, in
receiving coupons, and filling up and supplying certificates to the owners
or depositors of such coupons. 2. That when he issued such certificate
and delivered it to a third party, who acted without knowledge and in
good faith, paying value for it, such party had a right to act upon the
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presumption that the representations of such certificate were truththl,
and not false and fraudulent. 3. That having confided to him the special trust of executing that business, the agent was held out to the public as competent, faithful and worthy of confidence; and though he
deceived both his principal and the public, by forging and issuing the
false certificates, it was but reasonable that the principal who placed him
in the position to perpetrate the wrong should bear the loss. 4. That
the facts that the certificates happened to be in the hands of a party
who was an agent of the company, or that they happened to represent
on their face that the coupons had been deposited by such person, were
not sufficient of themselves to discredit the certificates, or to require of
innocent third parties to act upon the presumption that they were false
and fraudulent: Westerm ilarylandRailroad Co. v. Bank. 60 Md.
REM OVAL oF CAUSES.
Appealfrom Order allowing Removal- Variation in Form of Bond.
-An
appeal lies from an order of the Superior Court, granting a
petition for the removal of an action to the Circuit Court of the United
States : Ellis v. Atlantic & Facific R. R. Co., 134 Mass.
Section 689 of the U. S. Rev. Stats., provides that, upon certain conditions, an action commenced in a state court may be removed to the
Circuit Court of the United States for the district where the action is
pending, "next to be held after the filing of the petition for such
removal, and that "in order to such removal, the petitioner must, at the
time of filing his petition therefor, offer in said state court good and
sufficient surety for his entering in such Circuit Court, on the first day
of its session, copies of said process against him." The bond filed with
a petition for the removal of an action contained the condition that the
petitioner "shall enter in such Circuit Court, on the first day of its session -next after the granting of said petition, a copy of the record."
The next session of the Circuit Court for the district, held after the
granting of the petition, was the session next held after the filing of
the petition: field, that the variation in the form of the bond from
the words of the statute was immaterial : Id.
REPLEVIN. Se6 Attachment.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

See Common Carrier.

TAxEs.
Equity-Inunetion against Collection.-It is the doctrine of this
courf that equity will not enjoin the collection of taxes that are levied on
property subject to taxation, and which are due and unpaid, if the same
are legally imposed. A court of equity will never enjoin the collection
of taxes unless they are void, or levied without authority on the part of
the officers executing the revenue laws: flfoore v. Wa2yman, 107 Ill.
As long as such officers are acting under the law in imposing and collecting taxes, the courts will not interfere. They will -do so only when
such officers transcend their powers and act without legal warrant. Nor
will they interfere for the reason that the assessment is not strictly
according to the letter of the law; and when there is no ground for
enjoining the collection of a tax, the collector cannot be enjoined from
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making a tax deed to the holder of the certificate of purchase, unless
good cause is shown for matters which have transpired since the sale : Id.
TRuST.
Trustee-Authority to Sell-Mortgage-Confirmation by (estuts que
Trust.-A will creating a trust contained the following clause: "1My
said trustee shall have power to invest, and change the investment of
said moiety, and for that purpose to sell, convey and dispose thereof, or
any part thereof, as often as he may think proper." Held, 1. That this
power did not authorize the trustee to mortgage the property, to secure
the repayment of a loan. 2. That it was competent for the cestuis gue
trust, on arriving at age to confirm and make valid a mortgage executed
by the trustee, to secure a loan, but to make such confirmatory mortgage
binding on them, it must appear that they acted advisedly, with their
eyes open, with information in regard to every material circumstance
surrounding the transaction, with knowledge that the mortgage by the
trustee was not made in pursuance of the power conferred by the will,
and was not therefore binding on them, and that the money borrowed
was expended by him for his own personal use, and not for the benefit
of the trust estate: Wilson v. The Maryland LJfe Ins. Cu., 60 Md.
Debt due Cestui que Trust-Statute of Limitations-Application of
Balances due Trustee.-The orator was trustee under a deed of trust,
acting from 1865 to 1880. He boarded his ward, who was non comrpos
mentis, acted as his guardian, though not legally appointed, and owed
him a note of $800, given in 1864, which was not a part of the trust
property. The trust property consisted of real estate, which on the death
of the beneficiary, if he left no children, was to be divided between the
heirs of the grantor, the trustee being one of them. The beneficiary
having deceased, in settlement of the administration in a court of chancery'between the trustee and the other heirs, Held, 1. The trustee cannot plead the Statute of Limitations as a bar to the note he owed his
ward. 2. Nothing more than the income of the trust property could be
appropriated to the support of the ward until his other property was
used up. 3. The annual balance of the trustee's appropriations in behalf
of his ward above the income of the trust property the law will apply
on said note: Chamberlin v. Estey, 55 Vt..
WA ES.

See Attachment.
WILL.
Trust-PrecatoryWords-Near Relatives.-Words of request, desire,
expectation and the like in a will, are creative of tru'sts, when the contrary does not appear from the context or by necessary implication:
Handley v. Wrightson, 60 Md..
Precatory words in a will are sufficient to create a trust where the testator has pointed out with clearness and certainty the objects of the
trust and the subject-matter on which it is to attach, or from which it
is to arise and be administered: Id.
A testator devised all his lands to his son, and in the event of his
son's death "leaving no child of the lawful issue of his body at the
time of his death," declared it to be his will and desire that his wife,
S. W., should have his said lands or real estate so devised to his said
son, " with a special request that at her death she give the said lands to
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